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Introduction
It is well-known that balancedness is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. In the following we call such a non-transferable utility game a game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game. We also speak about coalitional balancedness if we mean the wellknown concept of balancedness of a family of coalitions. Scarf [12] gave a constructive proof of the nonemptiness of the core of a coalitionally balanced game in coalitional structure based on the complementary pivoting technique introduced by Lemke and Howson [9] . Shapley [13] generalized the intersection theorem of Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz on the unit simplex in order to prove the nonemptiness of the core, see also Ichiishi [5] . In Billera [3] balancedness of a coalitional game has been generalized to π-balancedness of such a game.
In this paper we generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game to a non-transferable utility game in which for any nonempty coalition a (possibly empty) set of attainable payoffs is given for any permutation or ordering upon a partition of the coalition into subcoalitions. This dependency on an ordered partition of the coalition reflects the situation in which the payoff set of a coalition is determined by the sequence in which the coalition is formed or on any hierarchy of the members of the coalition. In this way it is possible to differentiate between the players in the coalition, for instance between the player who takes the initiative to form the coalition, or is the most powerful player in the coalition, and the other players in the coalition. Another example is a situation when there is need for players to stand in a queue in order to get their payoff and waiting costs are involved. In such an environment it is necessary to differentiate the players in a coalition according to all the orderings of subsets of the coalition. Also for scheduling problems the outcome depends very much on the ordering of machines (i.e., players) to be processed.
Nowak and Radzik [11] have considered games in permutational form in case of transferable utilities and only permutations on the set of elements of a coalition are considered. For such TU games the value of the characteristic function depends on the ordering of the members of the coalition. Nowak and Radzik generalize the concept of the Shapley value for such games. We also refer to the work of Myerson [10] , who used undirected graphs to model communication structures in cooperative games. In this paper we consider nontransferable utility games with payoff sets for any permutation upon each possible partition of the coalitions. We call such a game a non-transferable utility game in permutational structure or shortly permutational game. The core of a permutational game consists of all payoff vectors attainable for the grand coalition such that there is no coalition having 1 a partition and permutation on the elements of this partition through which the coalition can improve upon the payoffs of all players in the coalition. Generalizing the concept of coalitional balancedness to balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permutational game by applying a new intersection theorem on the unit simplex. Moreover we prove that the core of a permutational game coincides with the core of an induced game in coalitional structure. We also give an example showing that balancedness of the permutational game does not imply balancedness of the corresponding coalitional game. This therefore leads to a weakening of the conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a game in coalitional structure. Next we refine the concept of core for a permutational game and show that for balanced permutational games this refinement is a nonempty subset of the core. We call this refinement the balanced-core of the game. By some examples we demonstrate that the balanced-core is indeed a proper subset of the core.
In Section 2 we introduce the concept of non-transferable utility permutational game. We also define for any permutational game an induced coalitional game and show that the core of the permutational game coincides with the core of the induced coalitional game. In Section 3 we define the concept of permutational balancedness and show that permutational balancedness of a permutational game does not imply coalitional balancedness of the induced coalitional game. In Section 4 we prove that balancedness of a permutational game is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core. This proof follows from a new intersection theorem on the unit simplex. If the induced coalitional game is not balanced, the nonemptiness of the core of this game follows from the nonemptiness of the core of the permutational game. In Section 5 we introduce the concept of balanced-core of a permutational game. In Section 6 we make some concluding remarks.
Permutational games
In an n-player cooperative non-transferable utility game introduced by Aumann and Peleg [2] each nonempty subset of players, called a coalition, can obtain any vector out of a certain subset of IR n as payoff vector. An attainable payoff vector lies in the core of the game if no coalition can improve upon this vector, see Aumann [1] . In this paper we introduce a cooperative non-transferable utility game in which the set of payoff vectors of a coalition is allowed to depend on the permutation or ordering on a partition of subcoalitions of the players in the coalition.
The set {1, . . . , n} of the n players in the game is denoted by N . For a nonempty subset S of N , called a coalition of players, let P . In the sequel a partition into t subcoalitions is called a t-partition and a permutation π(P 
Then the function V induces a non-transferable utility n-player game in coalitional structure, denoted by (N , V ). Observe that V (S) ⊂ V (S), but that generally V (S) is not equal to V (S). Moreover in Definition 2.1 we allow for empty payoff sets. Hence, it might be possible that some of the payoff sets V (S) are also empty. The core of the induced coalitional game (N , V ), denoted by C(N , V ), is as usual defined by the set of vectors u ∈ V (N ) such that there do not exist a coalition S ⊂ N and a vector v ∈ V (S) such
for all i ∈ S. Analogously we say that a payoff vector u is in the core of the permutational game if u ∈ V (N ) and there is no permutation π(P t S ) of a t-partition of a coalition S in which the coalition S can improve upon u.
Definition 2.2 Core of a Permutational Game
The core of a non-transferable utility permutational game (P N , V ) is the set of vectors u ∈ IR n satisfying that u ∈ V (N ) and there do not exist a coalition S with ordered partition π(P
Observe that a core element is an element of V (N ) because any vector u lying in a set V (π(P t N )) of some permutation of some t-partition P t N of the grand coalition is attainable and hence the payoff set of the grand coalition is not restricted to the set V (N ). In the sequel we denote the core of a permutational game (P We conclude this section with an example of an economic situation which can be modelled as a permutational game.
Example 2.4
We consider a firm with n employees. These employees have to perform all kinds of work, ranging from manual work (unskilled labour) to managerial work (high skilled labour). The employees have also different levels of skills. The problem is to which tasks which employees should be assigned. A coalition S denotes the set of employees getting a job, while the members outside S will be fired. Given a coalition S, the total amount work can be splitted up in t different tasks, with t ranging from 1 to |S|. For t = 1, each member of the coalition has to do the same task, including all types of work. So, in this case each member has to do for example both manual work and managerial work. For t = |S|, the work to be done is splitted up in specialized tasks as far as possible and all members of S have different tasks. Generally, for 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| we have t different tasks. To each task a group of employees of the set S will be assigned, yielding an ordered t-partition P t S of S. So, each member of S is assigned to precisely one task. We assume that these groups are ordered in such a way that the members of first group in this ordering are performing the most skilled labour and the members of the last group are performing the lowest skilled labour. The profit of the firm will depend on the ordered t-partition of subcoalitions and will be higher if the higher educated employees are asigned to the tasks needing more skills. Moreover it is assumed that the marginal utility of money for an employee in S depends on the task to which he is assigned. For instance, a high-skilled worker is more satisfied and therefore has a higher marginal utility of money when he is assigned to high-skilled tasks than when he is assigned to low-skilled tasks. For the permutation π(P t S ), let the number b i (π(P t S )) denote the marginal utility of money for employee i ∈ S and let its inverse be defined by a
)) denote the profit if the tasks are divided according to π(P
t S
). Finally, we assume that every employee has an outside option giving him payoff zero and that the firm can not be run by the employees if the assignment of the tasks is such that losses are made. Then the payoff sets are given by
and for any ordered partition π(P t N ) by
For illustration, take N = {1, 2} and let the data be given as in the following table.
The payoff sets corresponding to these data are drawn in Figure 1 . The core of this game consists of all nonnegative elements on the boundary of V ({1, 2}), so C(P
Balanced permutational games
The core of a non-transferable utility permutational game might be empty. However, it will be shown that the core is nonempty if the permutational game satisfies some balancedness condition differs from the well-known concept of balancedness of coalitions, in the sequel to be called coalitional balancedness. In this section we introduce the concept of permutational balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions and define the related concept of a permutationally balanced game. Moreover we show by an example that permutational balancedness of the permutational game does not imply coalitional balancedness of the induced coalitional game. Since it will be proved in Section 4 that balancedness of the permutational game is sufficient for the nonemptiness of the core, it also follows that it is sufficient for the nonemptiness of the core of a coalitional game induced by a permutational game that the underlying permutational game is balanced.
First, for some coalition S ⊂ N and permutation π(P 
6
) . The ordered 2-partition π(P 
3
) . Observe that only the components j ∈ S of the vector m π ( P t S ) get a positive power, the powers of two components is equal if they are in the same subset of the partition and that the total power of the components in some subset becomes greater if the subset has a higher priority in the ordering. . Observe that the ordered 2-partition ({1, 2}, {3}) of N is permutationally balanced, but that the family of the ordered 2-partition ({1}, {2}) and the ordered 1-partition ({3}) is not permutationally balanced.
In case B is a family of 1-partitions we have that π 
In the sequel we speak shortly about a balanced permutational (or coalitional) game if we mean a permutationally (coalitionally) balanced non-transferable utility permutational (coalitional) game. For a given permutational game (P N , V ) any vector in the set V (S) is attainable for coalition S. Since V (S) ⊂ V (S), and generally V (S) = V (S), the induced coalitional game (N , V ) need not to be coalitionally balanced if (P N , V ) itself is permutationally balanced. This fact is shown in the next example.
Example 3.5
Take n = 3 and define the permutational game (P N , V ) by
where V (i) denotes V ({i}) and V (i, j) denotes V (({i}, {j})). Furthermore,
and V (π) = ∅, otherwise.
Observe again that we allow for empty payoff sets. The induced coalitional game is given by (1, 1, 0) as the unique core element. For the permutational game this point lies in V (N ) and there is no coalition having an ordered partition through which the coalition can improve upon this outcome. The coalition {1, 2} can improve on each other point in V (N ) through the ordered 2-partition ({1}, {2}) or the ordered 2-partition ({2}, {1}). Also for the coalitional game the outcome (1, 1, 0) is the unique element of V (N ) on which the coalition {1, 2} cannot improve upon. Clearly the coalitional game is not balanced, since the family of coalitions {1, 2} and {3} is coalitionally balanced, whereas the point x = ( 1 2
On the other hand the permutational game is permutationally balanced. In fact there are only four relevant families of ordered partitions to consider, namely the family of the three ordered 1-partitions ({1}), ({2}), ({3}), the family of two ordered 2-partitions and one ordered 1-partition ({1}, {2}), ({2}, {1}), ({3}), the family of one ordered 2-partition and two ordered 1-partitions ({1}, {2}), ({2}), ({3}), and the family of one ordered 2-partition and two ordered 1-partitions ({2}, {1}), ({1}), ({3}). For each of these families we have that the intersection of the sets of payoffs of the members of the family is a subset of V (N ), for instance
For all other permutationally balanced families we have that the intersection of the payoff sets of the members of the family is empty and hence is a subset of V (N ).
Nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permutational game
In order to prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permutational game we first introduce an intersection theorem on the (n − 1)-dimensional unit simplex ∆ defined by
In this theorem the simplex ∆ is covered by closed subsets C π , π ∈ P N , satisfying some boundary condition. Under this condition there exists a balanced collection of permutations for which the corresponding subsets of ∆ have a nonempty intersection. This is stated in the next lemma, which is a generalization of the well-known intersection theorem of Shapley [13] , in which only sets C S are defined for coalitions S ⊂ N . The lemma is also closely related to intersection theorems given in Ichiishi and Idzik [6] and in van der Laan, Talman and Yang [8] . . For x ∈ ∆, define the set F (x) by
where Conv(X) denotes the convex hull of a set X ⊂ IR n . Clearly, for every x ∈ ∆, the set F (x) is nonempty, convex, and compact. Moreover, ∪ 
Proof.
Without loss of generality we may assume that 0 ∈ V ({i}) for any i ∈ N . To prove the theorem we define a closed covering {C Since 0 ∈ V ({i}) and because of iii), for every M > 0, λ x exists for any x ∈ ∆. Moreover, following Shapley [13] , by the condition of boundedness from above, M > 0 can be chosen so large that for every i ∈ N and x ∈ ∆, x i = 0 implies that i ∈ S for any S satisfying
Since every V (π) is closed and comprehensive, the collection of sets {C 
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For permutational games the concept of the core can be refined to what we will call the balanced-core. The balanced-core consists of all elements of the core that can be supported by a balanced collection of ordered partitions of coalitions and will be denoted by BC(P N , V ). We show that the balanced-core is nonempty if the game is permutationally balanced. In case the permutational game happens to be a coalitional game its balancedcore is equal to the core. In general the balanced-core of a permutational game is a proper subset of the core of this game, and so the balanced-core of a permutationally balanced game is a nonempty subset of its core. 
Clearly, it follows immediately from condition i) of Definition 5.1 that a payoff vector in the balanced-core lies also in the core of the permutational game. Condition ii) says that an element of the core is an elememt of the balanced-core only if it lies in the intersection of the payoff sets of a balanced collection of ordered partitioned coalitions. One could say that a core element lies in the balanced-core if it is supported by a balanced family of ordered partitions of coalitions. Since every player participates with equal weight in a balanced family of coalitions this gives some appealing stability property to the elements in the balanced-core. All players have an equal weight in supporting a balanced-core payoff vector. In some economic situations only one ordered partitioning of a coalition may actually be formed. In such situations the weight of an ordered partitioned coalition in the permutationally balanced family of ordered partitioned coalitions supporting the balancedcore element selected as the outcome can be interpreted as the probability with which the ordered partitioned coalition indeed forms. The following theorem is straightforward. Observe that a permutational game is essentially a coalitional game if for any ordered partitioning π(P In this paper we introduced permutational games and proved that the (balanced-)core of such a game is nonempty if the game is permutationally balanced. This concept of balancedness is a generalization of the well-known concept of balancedness of coalitions. Analogously the existence result concerning the nonemptiness of the core is more general than for games in coalitional structure. A game in coalitional structure is a special case in the family of games in permutational structure. Indeed, when V (π(P t S )) = ∅ for every t ≥ 2, then the permutational game is a game in coalitional structure and permutational balancedness coincides with coalitional balancedness. In general the induced coalitional game (N , V ) of a balanced permutational game, need not to be coalitionally balanced. Since a permutational game and its induced coalitional game have the same core, it follows that permutational balancedness of the underlying permutational game is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core.
Billera [3] has pointed out that in case of coalitional games there are many ways to define the powers of the players. In the same way there is a lot of freedom to define the powers in case of permutational games. For example, for a given ordered partition π(P ) if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t. This implies that every member in a higher ranked subcoalition has always more power than any member in a lower ranked subcoalition. Notice however that this has consequences in forming permutationally balanced families and hence on the fact whether or not a game in permutational structure is permutationally balanced. Since the core of a game does not depend on the definition of the power vectors, this implies that for the nonemptiness of the core of a permutational game it is sufficient to have permutational balancedness with respect to some collection of power vectors. Notice that if we take m , then the permutational game is balanced with respect to these constant (for every S) vectors if and only if the induced coalitional game is balanced. Hence, an induced coalitionally game being balanced implies that the original permutational game is permutationally balanced with respect to some collection of power vectors. Clearly, the other way around is not true, i.e., a coalitional game induced by a balanced permutational game may not be coalitionally balanced with respect to any set of power vectors. While the core is independent of the choice of the power vectors, the balanced core does depend on this choice. The choice of the power vectors should depend on the economic situation under consideration. The appropriate power vectors in a given application is a point of further research.
In Kamiya and Talman [7] a simplicial algorithm was proposed to find a core element of a coalitional game. Similarly, we can apply the simplicial algorithm on the unit simplex ∆ of Doup and Talman [4] to find approximately an element of the balanced-core and so a core element of a balanced permutational game.
